Showing posts with label Strategy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Strategy. Show all posts

Sunday, August 25, 2013

Marketing Myopia

Marketing myopia is an important paper first published in 1960 by Theodore Levitt, which argues that declining industries are results of failure of management to align their business with customers' needs. Levitt cites the railroads, which "assumed themselves to be in the railroad business rather than in the transportation business." By being "product oriented" instead of "customer oriented," the railroads allowed other modes to fulfill customers' transportation needs. Similarly, Levitt argues that Hollywood incorrectly defined its business as the movies, rather than the entertainment. By embracing a "specific, limited product," Hollywood "rejected TV when it should have welcomed it as an opportunity ... to expand the entertainment business."

This analysis resonates with the concept of business cycle. During the growth phase of an industry, its "assumed strength lay in the apparently unchallenged superiority of its product." However, Levitt believes that "there is no such thing as a growth industry," as there "are only companies organized and operated to create and capitalize on growth opportunities," while those who "assume themselves to be riding some automatic growth escalator invariably descend into stagnation."

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Sunday, June 23, 2013

Generic Competitive Strategies

The second chapter of Competitive Strategy looks at three approaches in "coping with the five competitive forces" outlined in the previous chapter, which are industry competitors, potential entrants, substitutes, suppliers, and buyers. The three strategies include overall cost leadership, differentiation, and focus. While they are not mutually exclusive, it is "rarely possible" to pursue multiple approaches.

Overall cost leadership entails "aggressive construction of efficient-scale facilities" to minimize cost, which provides "high margins which can be reinvested." This strategy is usually associated with high volume and market share. Differentiation sacrifices volume for perception of uniqueness industry-wide. Finally, focus strategy is "built around serving a particular target very well." Honed onto a particular segment only, focus can pursue either low cost, high differentiation position, or both.

The chapter notes that a "firm failing to develop its strategy in at least one of these three directions ... is in an extremely poor strategic situation" and "is almost guaranteed low profitability." These firms lose both the high-volume customers looking for low costs, and the high-margin business that depends on differentiation. While each of these strategies has its set of risks, these three generic competitive strategies give an intuitive explanation of the U-shaped relationship between profitability and market share, as observed in some industries.

Thursday, June 20, 2013

Backward and Forward Integration

The first chapter of Competitive Strategy talks about structural analysis of industries, which aims to relate "a company to its environment." Among the five competitive forces surrounding a company are industry competitors, potential entrants, substitutes, suppliers, and buyers. A buyers or supplier can exert competitive force with credible threat of backward or forward integration, respectively.

Buyer can engage in backward integration by purchasing the parts it typically procures from suppliers. This poses competitive force on the suppliers. On the other hand, suppliers can engage in forward integration by expanding activity "to include control of the direct distribution of its products," posing competitive force on the buyers typically involved in the distribution. The same company can be both a buyer or supplier in different markets. A manufacturing company, for example, may be the buyer in the market for raw materials, but becomes the supplier in the market of the assembled goods to other companies.

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